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Litigation Risk Broadly Considered 
Jerry D. Sullivan 
Public Oversight Board 
There is little doubt that litigation risk associated with the audit of  financial 
statements, as well as other attestation assurances, is presently at a level that 
threatens the viability of  the public accounting profession  and is contrary to the 
public interest. A decade ago, it was infrequent  to encounter a report of  auditor 
litigation in the financial  press. Today, it is virtually a daily occurrence. 
A decade ago, when the Auditing Standards Board was debating and finaliz-
ing Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, Audit  Risk and  Materiality  in 
Conducting  an Audit,  an appropriate distinction was made between audit risk 
and audit exposure which is essentially litigation risk. The auditor was cau-
tioned that when litigation risk was assessed as low, less extensive procedures 
should not be performed  than would be otherwise required under generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Today, litigation risk is never assessed as 
low and the aforementioned  cautionary note might be better restated to suggest 
that the auditor would be well advised to consider performing  more extensive 
procedures than might otherwise be required by GAAS when auditing public 
companies. 
The Current Environment 
Small firms  are divesting themselves of  attest engagements, large firms  are 
performing  risk assessments of  their clientele and resigning from  "risk engage-
ments" and curtailing many attest services, such as assurances on prospective 
financial  information.  Senior executives of  the Big Six firms  lament the fact  that 
divesting themselves of  smaller, lesser developed and more risky small public 
companies is contrary to the public interest as these entities are often  in need of 
the most sophisticated assistance in producing reliable financial  information. 
The actual cost of  litigation involving the accounting profession  has not been 
calculated, but it has reached proportions that threaten the solvency of  even the 
largest firms.  Spokesmen for  the Big Six firms  (those firms  are involved in most 
of  the litigation involving public companies) claim its aggregate cost is second 
only to human resources. Costs of  defense  on some cases have exceeded 
$15,000,000. Document reproduction alone is often  in excess of  $2,000,000 a 
case. The projected costs of  defense  for  many cases have reached a level that 
indicate settlement is economically prudent even when the firm  believes it has 
adequate defenses. 
Two recent highly publicized cases, the MiniScribe Corp. litigation involv-
ing Coopers & Lybrand and the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association litiga-
tion involving Ernst & Young, illustrate the level of  stakes involved and the 
incentive for  firms  to settle. 
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A recent editorial in the Wall  Street  Journal 1 reported: 
The Texas King of  Torts did it again, just as the Vice President was 
renewing his campaign to reform  the lawyers. 
Mr. Jamail's latest spin at the lottery wheel of  American justice is a 
good example of  the excesses. He won a $550 million judgment against 
MiniScribe Corp., $530 million of  it in punitive damages, from  a 
Galveston jury last week. This 25-to-1 ratio of  punitive to actual damages 
is typical of  a legal system out of  control, which is why Mr. Quayle wants 
states to limit punitives to an amount equal to the actual harm. 
MiniScribe is in bankruptcy, so much of  the ruinous judgment would 
be paid by its former  accountants at Coopers & Lybrand and former 
investment bankers at Hambrecht & Quist—who point out they were also 
defrauded,  for  much more than Mr. Jamail's bondholder clients. It's also 
an irony that it was an internal investigation by MiniScribe that uncovered 
the falsifying  of  records by some of  its employees. So whom is the legal 
system punishing for  what by assessing punitive damages? The jury, by 
the way, decided Mr. Jamail should get some $8 million for  his labors. 
The MiniScribe verdict was later overturned by the state judge presiding 
over the case to facilitate  a settlement among Coopers & Lybrand, Hambrecht 
& Quest and the plaintiffs  for  an undisclosed amount, thus avoiding a costly 
appeals process. 
In another recent Wall  Street  Journal  article2 the following  was reported: 
The nation's second largest law and accounting firms  agreed to pay a 
total of  $87 million to settle investors' fraud  claims arising from  the col-
lapse of  Lincoln Savings & Loan Association.... 
The investors' lawyers said in opening statements to a jury that they 
would claim $350 million in losses. Under Arizona's racketeering statutes 
and California's  punitive damages laws, both of  which could be applied in 
the case, potential liability could be tripled. 
That prospect led in part to the settlements, lawyers for  the two firms 
said. "The taint that affects  anyone who had any dealings with Charles 
Keating is so black that it is asking a great deal for  a jury to understand 
that auditors, too, can be victim," said Laurence Popofsky,  a San 
Francisco lawyer for  Ernst & Young. 
A coalition of  securities firms,  insurance companies, accounting firms,  law 
firms,  corporate directors, and other business organizations is working to seek 
litigation reform,  involving such matters as proportionate liability, fee  shifting, 
and discovery procedural reforms.  Tort reform  efforts,  even if  ultimately suc-
cessful,  are likely to move slowly. 
The large accounting firms  are presently accumulating aggregated cost data 
relating to litigation costs to support their efforts  for  reforms.  However, much 
more may be needed. For example, firms  are reporting that the existing litiga-
tion environment is having an adverse impact on entry level recruiting and their 
ability to retain competent partner level personnel. However, no empirical evi-
1 Amy Williams, "Ernst & Young and Jones Day Law Firm to Pay $87 Million in Lincoln Savings 
& Loan Case," The  Wall  Street  Journal,  March 31, 1992, p. A3. 
2 AICPA Professional  Standards, AU Section 561, "Subsequent Discovery of  Facts Existing of  Date 
of  Report." 
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dence has been gathered to substantiate or refute  their claims. 
There are other areas where it may be possible to develop empirical evidence 
to augment the proposition that the current level of  litigation risk the accounting 
profession  faces  is not in the public interest. I would like to suggest one area. 
My hypothesis is that the accounting profession's  litigation risk does not corre-
late to substandard performance  (audit risk). The data and arguments I present 
in support of  my hypothesis suffer  from  the same shortcomings academic 
research on auditor litigation has encountered—incomplete data for  analysis 
because of  the high incidence of  settlement before  adjudication. Nevertheless, I 
hope that this paper will suggest the need for  further  research and identify  areas 
that might be further  explored by those of  you who are more expert in research 
methodology than I. 
Both the peer review process and the investigation of  allegations of  audit 
failure  involving public registrants by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee 
(QC1C) provide an opportunity to identify  some data relevant to the quality of 
audits performed  by member firms  of  the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of  the 
American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants (AICPA). 
Peer Review Results 
As part of  the peer review of  member firms  of  the SECPS, engagements are 
selected and reviewed to determine whether they comply with professional  stan-
dards and the firm's  quality control system. The engagement selection involves 
a consideration of  risk factors  related to the firm,  such as industry concentration 
of  clients, new engagements, partner workload and experience, and other con-
trol risk and inherent risk factors  related to the firm's  practice. The engagement 
reviews are in sufficient  depth, and the Public Oversight Board's oversight 
process is sufficiently  vigorous, to provide reasonable assurance that they lead 
to a consistent and objective identification  of  audit failures  when they exist 
among the engagements reviewed. 
During the peer review of  engagements, an audit is determined to be substan-
dard if  the peer reviewer concludes (1) that one or more auditing procedures 
considered necessary at the time of  the audit in the circumstances then existing 
were omitted3 or (2) that the audited financial  statements are materially mislead-
ing, or the auditor's report inappropriate, thus requiring recall and revision.4 
This forensic  dissection of  engagements as part of  the peer review process 
provides an indication of  the incidence of  audit failure  among firms  that are 
members of  the SECPS. Table 1 summarizes the results of  engagements 
reviewed during the most recent three peer review years (1989-91). While the 
data relating to 1991 peer reviews is incomplete, that year completes the current 
cycle for  the peer review of  large firms  and the partial data summarized to date 
about substandard engagements is somewhat enlightening. 
When analyzing substandard performance  in the context of  litigation risk, it 
is necessary to distinguish between AU Section 390 failures  and AU Section 
561 failures.  Substandard engagements summarized as AU Section 390 failures 
are only those engagements in which, after  performance  of  the omitted proce-
3 AICPA Professional  Standards, AU Section 325, "Communication of  Internal Control Structure 
Related Matters Noted in an Audit." 
4 AICPA Professional  Standards, AU Section 390, "Consideration of  Omitted Procedures After  the 
Report Date." 
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Table 1 
SECPS Peer Review Engagement Review Results (1989 - 1991) 
Big Six Other 
Total Firms Firms 
1989 Engagements Reviewed 1497 340 1157 
Engagements Determined to be 
Substandard: 
AU 390 12 2 10 
AU 561 8 - 8 
1990 Engagements Reviewed 1909 298 1611 
Engagements Determined to be 
Substandard: 
AU 390 10 - 10 
AU 561 11 1 10 
1991 Engagements Reviewed 114 
Engagements Determined to be 
Substandard: 
AU 390 30 - 30 
AU 561 18 - 18 
* The Peer Review Committee has not yet processed all 1991 peer reviews and 
the data relating to other than Big Six firms  is incomplete. 
dure(s) by the practitioner, it was determined that neither the financial  state-
ments were materially misleading nor was the auditor's report inappropriate. 
Therefore,  those relying on the auditor's report were not misled and damaged. 
Thus, only substandard performance  summarized as an AU Section 561 failure 
should, in an ideal world, correlate with litigation risk, since only in those 
instances could a financial  statement user be misled and damaged. 
Over the three year period (1989-91) involving 742 engagement reviews of 
Big Six firms,  only one engagement was identified  as an AU Section 561 failure 
(.13% of  the engagements reviewed). During 1989 and 1990, a total of  2,768 
engagement reviews of  non-Big Six firms  were conducted and twenty such 
engagements were identified  as AU 561 failures  (.7% of  the engagements re-
viewed). Many of  the substandard engagements involving audits conducted by 
non-Big Six firms  during 1990 and 1991 were by firms  having their initial peer 
review as a result of  the AICPA bylaw change mandating SECPS membership 
for  all firms  that audit SEC registrant companies (sixteen of  twenty-one sub-
standard engagements identified  in 1990 and forty-five  of  the forty-eight  sub-
standard engagements identified  to date in 1991). 
The conclusion that can be drawn from  an analysis of  the incidence of  audit 
failure  identified  in the peer review program is that litigation risk should be 
much lower than the profession  presently experiences. It is estimated that the 
Big Six firms  report on approximately 12,000 public companies annually. The 
sole substandard engagement identified  in the 942 engagement reviews of  Big 
Six firms  was a small eleemosynary institution audit that was not subjected to 
the same quality control procedures applied to public company audits (for 
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example, concurring partner review). Therefore,  a "worst case" projection of 
audit failure  involving public companies would be sixteen (.13% of  12,000 
audits), whereas the actual number of  complaints filed  against Big Six firms 
involving their audits of  public companies annually is approximately three 
times that number. The only reasonable conclusion to be reached is that litiga-
tion risk does not correlate to substandard performance  by the profession. 
QCIC Investigations 
When a lawsuit involves the audit of  a public company (or an entity where 
there may be a public interest, such as a savings and loan institution), it is the 
QCIC's responsibility to determine if  the allegations suggest an aberrational 
error, a shortcoming in the firm's  quality control or its compliance with them, or 
a shortcoming in professional  standards. Member firms  must report to the QCIC 
all litigation or regulatory proceedings involving audits of  public companies or 
regulated financial  institutions within thirty days of  receiving a complaint. 
The QCIC's proceedings, conducted in strict confidence,  do not determine 
the merits of  a case or the culpability of  any party. Rather, their purpose is a 
review of  the firm's  policies and procedures to assure that, when appropriate, 
the firm  takes measures to upgrade its controls and compliance with them. In 
conducting its proceedings, the QCIC may interview firm  personnel, inspect 
firm  policy and guidance material, and examine selected workpapers to deter-
mine the need for  corrective action by the firm  or by standard-setters. 
QCIC cases are not closed until the committee is satisfied  that a firm  has 
properly addressed any weaknesses discovered in its quality control system and 
that matters that require consideration by the accounting and auditing standard-
setting bodies have been reported for  their consideration. The Public Oversight 
Board oversees all QCIC inquiries into alleged audit failures.  Its staff  reviews 
both the plaintiff's  allegations and the QCIC staff's  analysis of  them. Board 
members and/or its staff  attend meetings between firms  reporting litigation and 
QCIC task force  members, and participate in discussions about committee 
recommendations. 
Table 2 
QCIC Cases Reported 
Cumulative 
Cases Reported Annual Average 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
10 
12 
29 
31 
36 
42 
44 
44 
42 
53 
56 
44 
40 
10.0 
11.0 
19.0 
23.0 
25.6 
28.3 
30.5 
31.7 
32.9 
34.9 
36.9 
37.4 
39.2 1992 (8 Months) 
53 
Table 2 presents a tabulation of  the number of  cases reported to the QCIC since 
its inception. Because of  the sensitivity of  QCIC proceedings and concerns 
about their threat to "live" litigation, most documentation is destroyed shortly 
after  a case is closed. The only documentation retained is a copy of  the com-
plaint and the staffs  analysis of  the allegations. Since most cases are not adjudi-
cated, it is impossible to accumulate data relating to the outcome of  reported 
cases, particularly data relevant to a determination of  audit failure.  However, an 
analysis of  the complaints provides some data relevant to the environment in 
which litigation occurs and an understanding of  what areas of  financial  report-
ing plaintiff's  counsel believes to be deficient.  Ninety cases reported to the 
QCIC during the period 1989 through 1991 were selected for  analysis. Forty of 
the cases selected for  analysis involve the audits of  financial  institutions. Table 
3 summarizes data found  from  a review of  the complaints about the parties 
involved in the litigation and actions taken by the auditor. Table 4 summarizes 
data about the allegations in those cases. 
Table 3 
Analysis of  Ninety Cases Reported to QCIC 
Information  About Parties and Auditor Action 
Financial 
Institution 
Cases Other 
Total Cases 40 50 
Auditor: 
Big Six Firm 35 42 
Second Tier 4 3 
Other 1 5 
Financial statements restated 
or auditor withdrew opinion 5 7 
Auditor resigned or was terminated 11 8 
Auditor reported modified  opinion on 
financial  statements: 
Ability to continue as going concern 11 5 
Other 9 9 
Company condition when complaint was filed 
or end of  class period: 
Bankruptcy 23 15 
Severe decline in earnings and security value 13 35 
Plaintiff: 
Security holder 27 38 
Company management 4 4 
New management 3 4 
Creditor 3 1 
Government agency 4 1 
Insurer 1 2 
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Table 4 
Analysis of  Ninety Cases Reported to QCIC 
Information  About Allegations 
Financial 
Institution 
Cases Other 
Total Cases 40 50 
Existence of  Management Fraud 11 14 
Internal Controls: 
Material weakness not identified  by auditor 1 18 
Weaknesses not adequately considered 
when performing  the audit 16 8 
Weaknesses not communicated by auditor 6 2 
Principal Financial Statement or Auditor 
Report Defect: 
Revenue recognition 3 13 
Valuation of  assets 12 26 
Adequacy of  loan loss reserve 26 
Disclosure 3 3 
Fraudulent transaction 2 6 
Report not modified  for  continued existence 2 1 
Not obvious 6 6 
Litigation Risk Does Not Correlate to Audit Risk 
In the QCIC cases analyzed, all of  the non-financial  institution cases and 
ninety-six percent of  the financial  institution cases involved bankrupt entities or 
entities experiencing severe declines in their security values. The implication is 
that auditors' substandard performance  correlates to financial  difficulty  of  the 
entity being audited, i.e., the profession  can perform  well in profitable  and 
financially  successful  environments, but not so in financially  troubled environ-
ments. This is of  course a ludicrous proposition, but is easily explained. The 
objective of  plaintiff's  lawyers litigation directed at auditors is settlement, not 
adjudication of  the allegations. 
Most cases are resolved through settlement. Cases are settled at a "going 
rate" of  approximately one quarter of  the potential damages claimed.5 Plaintiffs' 
lawyers are sophisticated in identifying  potential class actions. Armed with 
computers they identify  potential class actions where a decrease in security 
price produces a market loss sufficient  to support an adequate level of  fees.  In 
discussing this phenomenon Alexander explains: 
Twenty million dollars is about the lowest potential recovery (damage 
claim) that could be expected to generate an attorney's fee  sufficient  to 
justify  maintaining a complex securities class action on a contingent fee 
5 Janet Cooper Alexander, "Do the Merits Matter? A Study of  Settlements in Security Class 
Actions," Stamford  Law Review, Volume 43:497, February 1991, pp. 513-14. 
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basis. Assuming that settlements can be expected to be approximately 
25% of  the claimed loss...attorneys fees  can be expected to be about 20-
30% of  the recovery. (Page 513) 
Alexander's research shows that most suits are filed  when a fee  in the range 
of  $1.25 million or more could be expected. Critics can find  degrees of  imper-
fection  in virtually every audit. The sufficiency  and competence of  evidential 
matter influencing  the auditor's judgment about the reporting entity's financial 
statements is not only a matter of  professional  judgment but it is also fact-de-
pendent and will vary from  audit to audit. These judgments about the sufficien-
cy and competence of  evidence, particularly relating to the valuation assertion, 
are focused  on by plaintiff's  counsel and most often  underlie allegations charg-
ing auditors with substandard performance,  when in fact,  the litigation is moti-
vated by the "plaintiff's  bar settlement model." 
Among the financially  troubled and bankrupt population of  companies, there 
are no doubt occasional instances of  substandard performance  by the auditor. 
There are other situations involving highly sophisticated management fraud 
where both the auditor and third parties have been deceived where the auditor's 
responsibility for  material irregularities in financial  statements is less obvious. 
Damaged parties will always contend that the auditor should have detected 
fraud  and this expectation gap is fueled  by occasional highly publicized cases 
where, based on the reported facts,  it appears that an alert, experienced audit 
team should have identified  related "red flags."  When conducting QCIC investi-
gations directed at evaluating the adequacy of  and compliance with firms'  quali-
ty control systems, we occasionally suspect a "busted audit." However, far  more 
often  the investigations lead us to the conclusion that the litigation is "frivo-
lous." 
Other Observations About QCIC Cases 
Continued Existence 
Among the fifty  non-financial  institution QCIC cases examined, sixteen 
entered into a form  of  bankruptcy proceedings. The auditors for  five  of  the six-
teen bankrupt entities modified  their opinion for  concerns about the ability to 
continue as a going concern during the financial  reporting year preceding bank-
ruptcy. The auditors for  seven of  the thirty-four  non-bankrupt entities modified 
their opinions on the financial  statements for  concerns about the ability to con-
tinue as a going concern. 
The above suggests that the auditor's "red flag"  identifying  going concern 
problems in the audit report may have little utility because of  the inherent 
inability to identify  entities that will become insolvent in the volatile market-
place and economy in which business operates. Further, it is interesting to note 
that the plaintiff's  attorney alleged failure  by the auditors to provide a "red flag" 
in only one of  the eleven bankruptcies that was not accompanied by an auditor's 
opinion modified  for  substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a 
going concern. 
Audit Evidence 
None of  the ninety QCIC cases examined suggest that the auditor did not 
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identify  evidence relating to the allegations, with the exception of  the identifica-
tion of  "side agreements" related to a number of  financial  institution audits. 
This suggests the sufficiency  of  audit procedures applied by the profession  for 
identifying  evidential matter about which an audit judgment must be made. The 
allegations, for  the most part, call into question the auditor's judgment about the 
evidence identified  in the audit, particularly valuation judgments and income 
recognition matters. Table 4 summarizes the allegations. 
As firms  in recent years have revised their audit approaches to be consistent 
with the SAS No. 47 risk model, similarities in audit methodology are more 
apparent than differences.  An example of  this is that all of  the large firms  now 
use non-statistical sampling plans to the virtual exclusion of  statistical sampling 
plans. During the most recent cycle of  Big 6 firm  peer reviews that have includ-
ed 742 engagement reviews, we do not recall seeing one statistical sampling 
application. The most plausible reason for  this is that non-statistical sampling 
plans are less expensive and experience has demonstrated the sufficiency  of 
audit evidence identified  by them. 
Statistical sampling plans are still used for  a limited number of  special pur-
pose applications, usually involving the requirements of  governmental agencies. 
These applications are usually planned and assisted by specialists in the firms. 
Academics, when planning their research projects and class syllabi, should con-
sider the limited use of  statistical sampling, and quantitative techniques general-
ly, in the audit of  financial  statements. 
Management Integrity and Internal Control 
In fourteen  of  the fifty  non-financial  QCIC cases examined, there was an 
allegation of  management fraud.  Among the fourteen  cases involving an allega-
tion of  management fraud,  eleven allegations related to entities with revenues of 
less than $100 million (six of  which had revenues of  less than ten million dol-
lars). Most of  the smaller entities involved owner-manager dominance. 
The Internal  Control—Integrated  Framework,  Revised  Draft  (February 
1992), of  the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of  the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), indicates that management integrity and ethical values 
are an integral component of  internal control. Unfortunately,  these attributes 
cannot be evaluated based on any known objective criteria. They are personal 
qualities, not processes like risk assessment, and reasonable men can differ 
greatly about their acceptability. Public reporting on the adequacy of  internal 
controls, including attributes of  management integrity and ethical values in the 
control structure, is both questionable and dangerous. It is not reasonable to 
expect that management will ever evaluate its members as lacking in these per-
sonal attributes, nor will it be possible for  others to do so, except in the most 
egregious situations-and well after  the fact. 
In discussing its application to small entities, the draft  COSO report states, 
for  example: 
Although small and even mid-size companies may find  it difficult  to 
bring outside directors on to the board, absence of  such directors (or an 
audit committee) does not necessarily create a weak control environment. 
A board that consists solely of  an entity's officers  and employees who 
report to the owner-manager can adequately perform  necessary gover-
nance, guidance, and oversight responsibilities.... 
57 
Thus, the draft  COSO report suggests that not only can management of  small 
companies evaluate objectively their own integrity and ethical values, as well as 
the adequacy of  other components of  the entity's control system, they can do so 
and report to the public without the oversight of  an independent audit commit-
tee. Owners of  smaller companies, once choosing to raise capital in the public 
markets, should be required to have audit committees with independent mem-
bers to assist in safeguarding  the interests of  absentee equity and debt stake-
holders. A failure  of  a public company to do so should be regarded as a serious 
deficiency  in its internal control structure. 
COSO recommends that the threshold for  modifying  the report should be an 
uncorrected material weakness. Many of  the components of  internal control 
identified  by COSO, such as integrity, ethical values and an absence of  audit 
committees, do not easily lend themselves to the concept of  a material weak-
ness. The likely result of  management reporting following  the COSO guidance 
is that reporting entities will routinely provide "clean reports," and auditors will 
be called upon to provide assurance on these reports, even when there are 
numerous significant  deficiencies  in the control structure identified  as 
"reportable conditions."6 This suggests that the plaintiff's  bar in future  litigation 
will more routinely allege that the management of  various companies and their 
auditors have misled and damaged third parties because of  assertions about the 
adequacy of  internal controls where significant  deficiencies  have been identi-
fied.  To minimize this danger, there should be an acknowledgment in public 
reports that weaknesses in internal control have been identified  and are being 
addressed by management. 
The Auditor's Opinion 
After  years of  controversy, criticism and deliberation, the Auditing Standards 
Board revised the auditor's standard report in 1988, the first  revision in thirty-
eight years. The revision was directed primarily at more clearly explaining the 
elements of  an audit and the degree of  assurance being provided by the auditor. 
The nature of  allegations in auditor litigation suggests another revision may be 
in order. 
The sufficiency  and competence of  evidential matter available to assess man-
agement's assertions about sensitive valuation judgments often  do not reduce 
audit risk sufficiently  to justify  the degree of  assurance being provided in the 
auditor's report on historical financial  statements. The following  is an example. 
The evidential matter available to the auditor to support a judgment about the 
carrying value of  a financial  institution's loan or equity participation in a real 
estate project under development is limited primarily to an evaluation of:  (a) the 
developer's reputation and financial  stability, the latter usually being highly 
dependent on the success of  the project being considered; (b) assumptions re-
lating to market feasibility;  and (c) costs incurred to date related to percentage 
of  completion estimates and additional development funds  available. 
If  the auditor was requested to provide assurance to a third party in a separate 
financial  presentation related to the real estate project, the presentation would 
be cast as a financial  forecast  and the auditor's report would include a caveat 
6 AICPA Professional  Standards, AU Section 325, "Communication of  Internal Control Structure 
Related Matters Noted in an Audit." 
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that the prospective results are dependent on assumptions that may not be 
achieved. Yet, the same assets included in a historical financial  statement would 
result in the auditor expressing a clean opinion on the valuation assertion related 
to the project. 
This dichotomy in auditor assurance cannot be theoretically justified  nor 
rationally supported. It should be no surprise that the auditing profession  is 
being held culpable for  the savings and loan debacle by the financial  press, 
Congress, investors and government agencies, and more recently for  the failure 
of  many banks. The financial  collapse of  many of  these entities resulted directly 
from  their equity participation in and loans to real estate projects. The auditor's 
assurances about the valuation assertions related to these projects was at the 
same level as assurance provided on the carrying value of  the cash account. 
Conclusion 
The accounting profession  has a unique role in society as a provider of  third 
party assurances on the reliability of  client-prepared financial  information.  In 
meeting this responsibility, the profession  has found  itself  beset with increasing 
litigation risk that more directly correlates to the financial  difficulties  of  some 
clients than to its own substandard performance.  Unlike the statistical dispersion 
of  malpractice actions against other professionals,  the accounting profession's 
litigation risk is concentrated among a limited number of  firms  that audit most 
public companies. While the litigation risk of  these firms  is increasing, audit 
risk appears to be managed in a way that limits substandard performance  to a 
reasonably low level, particularly in firms  that have mature quality control sys-
tems meeting the membership requirements of  the SEC Practice Section. 
The accounting profession  must continue to strive to even further  lower the 
incidence of  substandard performance.  However, it is unreasonable and, in the 
long run, contrary to the public interest in reliable financial  reporting for  the 
legal system to operate in a way that encourages plaintiffs'  attorneys to bring 
actions against accountants on the basis of  a calculation of  loss in client security 
values necessary to support a profitable  settlement. This results in accounting 
firms  being penalized for  the financial  troubles of  their clients rather than sub-
standard performance  and leads to an unwarranted erosion of  confidence  in the 
profession  as well as its financial  viability. 
This paper identifies  a few  facets  of  the accounting profession's  litigation 
risk relating to attest performance  and reporting that may warrant research by 
the academic community; there are undoubtedly others. Research and other 
scholarly inquiries may assist in bringing about reforms  to our legal system or 
minimizing the profession's  exposure to it. 
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